We prove that no fully transactional system can provide fast read transactions (including read-only ones that are considered the most frequent in practice). Specifically, to achieve fast read transactions, the system has to give up support of transactions that write more than one object. We prove this impossibility result for distributed storage systems that are causally consistent, i.e., they do not require to ensure any strong form of consistency. Therefore, our result holds also for any system that ensures a consistency level stronger than causal consistency, e.g., strict serializability. The impossibility result holds even for systems that store only two objects (and support at least two servers and at least four clients). It also holds for systems that are partially replicated. Our result justifies the design choices of state-of-the-art distributed transactional systems and insists that system designers should not put more effort to design fullyfunctional systems that support both fast read transactions and ensure causal or any stronger form of consistency.
INTRODUCTION
Transactions represent a fundamental abstraction of distributed storage systems, as they facilitate the task of building correct applications. For this reason, distributed transactional storage systems are widely adopted in production environments [10, 33, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57] and actively researched in academia [19, 44, 59, 61, 64] . Because many applications exhibit read-dominated workloads [6, 17, Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SPAA '19, June 22-24, 2019 46, 47] , read-only transactions are a particularly important building block of such systems. Hence, improving the performance of distributed read-only transactions has become a key requirement for modern such systems and a much investigated research topic [19, 40, 41] . To this end, the notion of fast read-only transactions has been introduced in [41] and studied in subsequent papers [23, 31, 60] . A fast read-only transaction satisfies the following three desirable properties [41] : it completes in one round of communication (one-round), it does not rely on blocking mechanisms (nonblocking), and each server communicates to the client only one value for each object that it stores locally and is being read (one-value). Unfortunately, despite the huge effort put on designing efficient distributed transactional systems, read-only transactions in existing systems still suffer from performance limitations. For example, systems like Spanner [19] , DrTM [61] , RoCoCo [44] implement read-only transactions that may require multiple rounds of communication, or rely on blocking mechanisms.
In systems that implement strong consistency, e.g., serializability [15] , transactions facilitate the task of writing distributed applications by giving the illusion that concurrent operations take place sequentially. However, strong consistency comes at such a high cost [11, 36] that, over the last years, a flurry of systems has abandoned strong consistency in favor of weaker consistency models [18, 21, 39, 51] . Among them, causal consistency [2] has garnered much attention, because it was expected to hit a sweet spot in the performance versus ease-of-programming trade-off. Causal consistency has intuitive semantics and eschews the synchronization that is needed to achieve strong consistency in the presence of replicas. It is also the strongest consistency level that can tolerate network partitions without blocking operations [7, 50] .
As expected, existing causally consistent storage systems achieve higher performance in comparison to strong consistency systems [3, 26, 39, 40] . However, causally consistent read-only transactions still suffer from latency overheads. In fact, state-of-the-art causally consistent storage systems either do not support fast read-only transactions [3, 26, 43, 55] (i.e., they do not exhibit all three desirable properties) or they are of restricted functionality by not providing multi-object write transactions [41] . Contributions. In this paper, we present a result proving a fundamental limitation of transactional systems. Specifically, our impossibility result states that no fully-functional, causally consistent distributed transactional system can provide fast read-only transactions (and therefore also fast read transactions). Specifically, to achieve fast read transactions, the system has to give up support of multi-object write transactions, i.e., it can only support transactions that write at most one object. This result unveils an important trade-off between the latency attainable by read-only transactions and the functionality provided by a distributed storage system. It also shows that the inefficiency of the existing systems to achieve all the desirable properties (as described above) is not a coincidence.
Most theoretical results considered so far serializable transactions instead of causally consistent that we consider here, and this work includes a formalization of causally consistent transactional systems which is interesting in its own right. Our result holds for any system that ensures stronger consistency than causal consistency. Moreover, our result is relevant for the broad class of systems that use causal consistency as a building block to achieve their target consistency level [13] or that implement hybrid consistency models which include causal consistency [5, 35, 36, 58] . The impossibility result holds for any system that supports at least two servers and at least four clients. It holds even for systems that store only two objects (each in a different server). We prove that the impossibility result also holds for systems that are partially replicated.
To prove our impossibility result, we construct a troublesome infinite execution in which a write-only transaction that is executed solo never manages to make the values it writes visible. To do so, we inductively construct an infinite number of non-empty prefixes of the troublesome execution and prove that the written values are not yet visible after each prefix has been executed; specifically, some server has to send at least one more message before the values become visible. We argue this using indistinguishability arguments [9, 42] . The fact that, on the one hand, the constructed execution is infinite, and, on the other, that we focus on causal consistency which is a rather weak consistency condition, introduces complications that we have to cope with to get the proof.
In the case where the system has more than two servers, an extra challenge is to cope with the chains of messages through which information may be disseminated between the servers that store the written objects. This complicates the construction of the executions that we prove to be indistinguishable from the troublesome execution. To get the impossibility result for the case of a partially replicated system, an additional complication is that we have to construct an infinite sequence of server ids. These are the servers that send the necessary messages in each step for the induction to work. We also have to capture the fact that more than one servers may now respond to the same read request of a client. Due to lack of space, the general proof is provided in a technical report [22] .
We study the limits of our impossibility result in all different premises. We show that if we relax any of the considered properties, then the impossibility result no longer holds.
Our impossibility result sheds light on some of the design decisions of recent systems and provides useful information to system designers. Specifically, they should not put more effort to devise a fully-functional system that supports both fast read transactions and ensures causal consistency (or any stronger consistency level). Structure of the paper. Section 2 provides the model and useful definitions. Section 3 presents our impossibility result and discusses its limits in all different premises. Section 4 discusses related work. Section 5 provides some conclusions.
MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Storage system. We consider a distributed storage system which stores a finite number of objects. There are m > 1 servers in the system. Each server stores a non-empty set of these objects. For simplicity, we assume that the set of objects stored in servers are disjoint. (Our result holds even if the system is partially replicated, i.e., if these sets are different but not disjoint, and none of them contains all the objects.)
Transactions. An arbitrarily large number of clients may read and/or write one or more objects by executing transactions. A transaction is a block of code that contains a sequence of read and write requests on objects. To prove our impossibility results, it is enough to focus on static transactions whose read-sets and write-sets are known from the beginning of the execution 1 . The read-set, R T , of a transaction T contains the objects T reads, whereas its write-set, W T , contains the objects T writes. If W T = ∅, T is called a read-only transaction, whereas if R T = ∅, T is a write-only transaction. We denote by r (X )x a read on object X which returns value x and by w (X )x a write of value x to object X . Also, we denote by r (X ) * a read on object X when the return value is unknown (with symbol * as a place-holder). Reads and writes on objects are called object operations.
In typical deployments, there are many more clients than servers. Hence, allowing server-to-client out-of-band communication would result in nonnegligible overhead on the servers, which would suffer from reduced scalability and performance. For this reason, we naturally assume that to execute a transaction, a client can communicate with the servers (but not with other clients) and a server communicates with a client only to respond to a client's read or write request. So, no client-to-client communication is allowed, i.e. no client can send a message to any other client. We find evidence of the relevance of this assumption in large-scale production systems, such as Facebook's data platform [46] , and in emerging systems [24, 30, 38] and architectures [37] for fast query processing, where no per-client states are maintained to avoid the corresponding overheads and to achieve the lowest latency. System model. The system is asynchronous, i.e., the delay on message transmission can be arbitrarily large and the processes do not have access to a global clock. The system is modelled as an undirected graph in the standard way [9, 42] . Each node of the graph represents a process (i.e., a client or a server) whereas links connect every pair of processes. Each process is modelled as a state machine with its state containing a set of income and outcome buffers [9, Ch. 2] 2 . Links do not lose, modify, inject, or duplicate messages. Operation executions. An implementation of a storage system provides algorithms, for each process, to execute reads and writes in the context of transactions. A configuration represents an instance of the system at some point in time. In an initial configuration Q in , all processes are in initial states and all buffers are empty (i.e., no message is in transit). There are two kinds of events in the system: (1) a computation step taken by a process, in which the process reads all messages residing in its income buffers, performs some local computation and may send (at most) one message to each 1 It follows that our impossibility result also holds for systems of dynamic transactions. 2 There is one income and one outcome buffer for each link incident to each process. Income and outcome buffers store the messages that are sent or received through the corresponding link, respectively.
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SPAA '19, June 22-24, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA of its neighboring processes 3 , and (2) a delivery event, where a message is removed from the outcome buffer of the source and is placed in the income buffer of the destination. An execution is a sequence of events (we assume that an execution also includes the invocations and responses of transactions, as well as the invocations and responses of object operations). An execution α is legal starting from a configuration C, if, for every process p, every computation step taken by p in α is compatible to p's state machine (given p's state in C) and all messages sent are eventually received. Since the system is asynchronous, the order in which the events appear in an execution is assumed to be controlled by an adversary. A reachable configuration is a configuration that results from the application of a legal finite execution starting from an initial configuration. Given a reachable configuration C, we say that a computation step s by a process p eventually occurs, if in every legal execution starting from C (in which p takes a sufficient number of steps), p executes s. For every reachable configuration C and every legal execution α from C, we denote by RC (C, α ) the configuration that results from the execution of α starting from C. Two executions are indistinguishable to a process p, if p executes the same steps in each of them. Two configurations are indistinguishable to p, if p is in the same state in both configurations. Given two executions α 1 and α 2 , we denote by α 1 · α 2 the concatenation of α 1 with α 2 , i.e., α 1 · α 2 is an execution consisting of all events of α 1 followed by all events of α 2 (in order). Each client that invokes a transaction T may eventually return a response. The response consists of a value for each object in R T , and an ack for each write T performs. We say that T has completed (or is complete), if the client c that invoked T has issued all read or write requests for T , and has received responses by the servers for all these requests. Note that for each read or write request that c invokes, it receives an individual response from the corresponding server. A transaction T is active in some configuration C if it has been invoked before C and has not yet completed. A client may have at most one active transaction at each point in time. We say that a configuration C is quiescent if no transaction is active at C. Let C be any reachable configuration that is either quiescent or only a single transaction T , invoked by a client c, is active at C. We say that T executes solo starting from C, if only c and the servers take steps after C and c does not invoke any transaction other than T after C. We say that a value x is written in an execution α if there exists some transaction T in α that issues w (X )x for some object X . For convenience, every execution we consider, starts with the execution of two initial transactions,
that write the initial values x in 0 and x in 1 in objects X 0 and X 1 , respectively. Causal Consistency. We consider an implementation of a transactional storage system that is causally consistent [2, 52] . Informally, causal consistency ensures that causally-related transactions should appear, to all processes, like if they have been executed in the same order. The formal definitions below closely follow those presented for causally consistent transactional memory systems in [27] .
The history H (α ) of an execution α is the subsequence of α which contains only the invocations and responses of object operations (we omit α whenever it is clear from the context). A transaction T is in H , if H contains at least one invocation of an object operation by T . A transaction is complete in H if it is complete in α. An object operation op 1 precedes another object operation op 2 in α (or in H (α )), if the response of op 1 precedes the invocation of op 2 . A transaction T 1 precedes another transaction T 2 in α (or in H (α )), if the last object operation invoked by T 1 precedes the first object operation invoked by T 2 .
For each client c, we denote by H c the subsequence of H containing all invocations and responses of object operations issued or received by c. Given two executions α and α ′ , the histories H (α ) and H (α ′ ) are equivalent, if for each client c, H c (α ) = H c (α ′ ). For each client c, the program-order, denoted by < H |c , is a relation on transactions in H c such that for any two transactions T 1 ,T 2 , T 1 < H |c T 2 if and only if T 1 precedes T 2 in H c . We denote by complete (H ) the subsequence of all events in H issued and received by complete transactions 4 .We denote by comm(H ) a history that extends H : (1) comm(H ) = H · H ′′ , i.e., H is a prefix of comm(H ), (2) H ′′ contains only responses for those write operations in H for which there is no response.
An execution σ is sequential if for every two transactions T 1 , T 2 in σ , either T 1 precedes T 2 or vice versa. We define a sequential history in a similar way. Consider a sequential execution σ (legal from Q in ) and a transaction T in σ . We say that T is legal in σ , if for every invocation r (X )x of a read operation on any object X that T performs, the following hold: (1) if there is an invocation of a write operation by T that precedes r (X )x in σ then x is the value argument of the last such invocation, (2) otherwise, if there are no transactions preceding T in σ which invoke write for object X , then x is the initial value for X , (3) otherwise, x is the value argument of the last invocation of a write operation to X , by any transaction that precedes T in σ .
Consider any sequential history S that is equivalent to H . We define a binary relation with respect to S, called reads-from and denoted by < r S , on transactions in H such that, for any two distinct transactions T 1 ,T 2 in H , T 1 < r S T 2 if and only if: (1) T 2 executes a read operation op that reads some object X and returns a value x for it, and (2) T 1 is the transaction in S which executes the last write operation that writes x for X and precedes T 2 5 . Each sequential history S that is equivalent to H , induces a reads-from relation for H . Let R H be the set of all reads-from relations that can be induced for H (by considering all equivalent to H sequential histories).
We say that a sequential history S respects some relation < on the set of transactions in H if it holds that for any two transactions
For each < r in R H , we define the causal relation for < r on transactions in H to be the transitive closure of c < H |c ∪ < r . We denote by C H the set of all causal relations in H .
Definition 1 (Causal consistency
). An execution α is causally consistent if for history H ′ = comm(H (α )), there exists a causal relation < c in C compl et e (H ′ ) such that, for each client c i , there exists a sequential execution σ i such that:
• H (σ i ) is equivalent to complete (H ′ ),
• H (σ i ) respects the causality order < c , and
An implementation is causally consistent if each execution α it produces is causally consistent. Intuitively, a causally consistent distributed transactional system produces executions that respect the causality order. The necessity to talk about sets of reads-from relations and sets of causal relations comes from the fact that the values written in an execution α are not distinct. If we assume that all values written in α are distinct, some of the above definitions would be simplified. Note that doing so would be sufficient to prove the impossibility result. However, we present the general formal definition above, since we believe that it might be of interest in its own right. Progress. To avoid trivial implementations where every read-only transaction invoked by a client always returns ⊥ or values written by the same client, we introduce the concept of value visibility. Definition 2 (Value visibility). Consider any object X and let C be any reachable configuration which is either quiescent or just a write-only transaction (by a client c w ) writing a value x into X (and possibly performing additional writes) is active in C. Value x is visible in C, if and only if: in every legal execution starting from C which contains just a read-only transaction T r (invoked by a client c {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 }) that reads X , x is returned as X 's value for T r . We focus on storage systems that ensure minimal progress for write-only transactions. This is a weak progress property ensured even by systems in which write transactions are blocking. So, our impossibility result holds also for systems that ensure any stronger progress properties for write-only transactions (and without any restriction on progress for transactions that both read and write). Definition 3 (Minimal Progress for write-only transactions). Let T w be any write-only transaction which writes a value x into an object X (T w may also write other objects). If T w executes solo, starting from any reachable quiescent configuration C, then there exists a later configuration C ′ such that x is visible in C ′ .
We denote by Q 0 a reachable configuration in which both values x in 0 and x in 1 , written by the transactions T in 0 and T in 1 discussed earlier, are visible. Definition 3 implies that Q 0 is well-defined.
We next present the definition of fast read-only transactions. Definition 4 expresses the exact same properties as in the original definition which was introduced in [41] and used in [23, 31] . Definition 4 (Fast read-only transaction). We say that an implementation of a distributed storage system supports fast read-only transactions, if in each execution α it produces, the following hold for every read-only transaction T executed in α:
(1) Non-blocking and One-Roundtrip Property. The client c which invoked T sends a message to all servers storing items that it wants to read and it does so in one computational step; moreover, each server performs at most one computational step to serve the request and respond to c. (2) One-value messages. Each message sent from a server to a client contains only one value that has been written by some write transaction in α into an object that is stored in the server and is read by the client 6 .
THE IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
In this section, we prove the impossibility result: Theorem 1. No causally consistent implementation of a transactional storage system supports transactions that write to multiple objects and fast read-only transactions.
The impossibility result holds even for systems that store just two objects X 0 and X 1 . For ease of presentation, we prove it for a system with two servers p 0 and p 1 . However, it can easily be extended to hold for the general case, where the system has any number of servers and is partially-replicated (see [22] for the general proof). We assume that p 0 stores X 0 and p 1 stores X 1 .
Outline of the Proof
We prove Theorem 1 by the way of contradiction. Assume that there exists a causally consistent implementation Π which supports fast read-only transactions and transactions that write multiple objects. Assume also that Π guarantees minimal progress for write-only transactions. We derive a contradiction by showing that there exists a troublesome execution which breaks minimal progress. Specifically, we construct an infinite execution α which contains just a write-only transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1 )x 1 ), invoked by some client c w {c in 0 , c in 1 }, and we show that the values x 0 and x 1 written by T w never become visible. Intuitively, to do so, we inductively construct an infinite number of non-empty distinct prefixes of α and prove that the written values are not yet visible after each prefix has been executed. Specifically, we use indistinguishability arguments [9, 42] to prove that after the execution of each such prefix, some server has to still send at least one message before the values become visible. (In [22] , we provide a table that describes the notation used throughout the proof.)
We now provide an informal, high-level outline of the proof. We start with two simple lemmas. The first shows that a transaction which reads X 0 and X 1 cannot return a subset of the values written by T w (i.e., it returns either the new values for both objects or the initial values for both objects). The second lemma shows that if one of the values written by T w is not visible, then both values written by T w are not visible. We use these lemmas to determine the values read by read-only transactions in the executions that we use. Specifically, we present two execution constructions that are useful in the proof of Theorem 1. Construction 1 describes an execution in which a read-only transaction reads the initial values for X 0 and X 1 , whereas Construction 2 describes an execution in which a read-only transaction reads the new values for X 0 and X 1 .
The two constructions are used to build an execution γ which allows us to derive a contradiction: In γ , a read-only transaction reads a mix of old and new values for X 0 and X 1 . We use γ to prove, in the induction, that the values written by T w are not yet visible. We also prove that to make them visible, p 0 and p 1 have to exchange more messages. Therefore, after any arbitrary but finite number of steps, T w has not yet completed and the values written by it has not yet become visible, which contradicts eventual visibility.
Useful Constructions and Lemmas
To enforce a causal relation between the values written by c w in T w and x in 0 , x in 1 , the troublesome execution starts with the execution of a read-only transaction T in r = (r (X 0 ) * , r (X 1 ) * ) by c w (applied from Session 10 SPAA '19, June 22-24, 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA Q 0 ). Since T in r is a fast read-only transaction, T in r completes; since x in 0 and x in 1 are visible in Q 0 (by definition), c w returns (x in 0 , x in 1 ) for T in r . Let C 0 be the configuration in which T in r has completed and no message is in transit. The configurations Q in , Q 0 , C 0 are shown in Figure 1 . All executions we refer to below start from C 0 . We now present the two lemmas that will be useful for the constructions and the proof of Theorem 1. The first states that in an execution in which a write transaction writes new values to a set of objects, a read transaction which reads these objects, cannot see only a subset of the new values. The proof comes as an immediate consequence of the fact that Π ensures causal consistency. Lemma 1. Let τ be any legal execution of Π starting from C 0 which contains two transactions: client c w invokes a write-only transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1 )x 1 ), and a client c r c w invokes a read-only transaction T r = (r (X 0 ) * , r (X 1 ) * ) which completes in τ . Let v 0 and v 1 be the two values which c r returns for T r , i.e.,
Proof of Lemma 1. To derive a contradiction, assume that there exists some execution τ of Π starting from C 0 and some i ∈ {0, 1} for which c r returns the values v i = x i , v 1−i = x in 1−i for T r . By causal consistency, c r 's local history in τ respects causality. So, we can totally order T in 1−i , T w and T r such that (1) T in 1−i is the last transaction which writes to X 1−i and precedes T r , so T w (which also writes X 1−i ) precedes T in 1−i ; (2) T w is the last transaction which writes on X i and precedes T r , so T w is ordered before T r ; and (3) T in 1−i is ordered before T w because c w reads the value written in T in
before it initiates T w (as shown in Figure 1) . A contradiction. □
The next lemma states that in an execution in which a write transaction T w writes new values in a set of objects, if one of the values written by T w is not visible at some configuration, then both values written by T w are not visible in that configuration.
Lemma 2. Let τ be any legal execution starting from C 0 which contains just one transaction: client c w executes a write-only transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1
Proof of Lemma 2. To derive a contradiction, consider some configuration C, reachable when τ is applied from C 0 , in which at least one of the values x 0 and x 1 is not visible, and assume that for every client c r {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 }, if c r invokes T r starting from C, then c r does not return (x in 0 , x in 1 ) for T r . Notice that since Π ensures that read-only transactions are fast, T r completes. Then by Lemma 1, c r returns (x 0 , x 1 ). Since this holds for every client c r not in {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 }, Definition 2 implies that at C both x 0 and x 1 are visible. This contradicts the hypothesis that at least one of the two values is not visible in C. □ Notice that Lemma 2 holds for C = C 0 , i.e., when τ is empty.
We now present Constructions 1 and 2 which are illustrated in Figure 2 . Roughly speaking, the constructions illustrate two executions in which a write-only transaction T w writes values x 0 and x 1 to objects X 0 and X 1 , respectively, and a read-only transaction T r reads X 0 and X
We start with an intuitive description of Construction 1 which is depicted in Figure 2(a) . Assume, without loss of generality, that i = 0. (The construction when i = 1 is symmetric.) The construction produces an execution in which T w starts executing from C 0 and runs solo up to any configuration C in which x 0 is not yet visible. Next, T r is initiated from C and takes steps until it sends a message to both servers. The adversary schedules the receipt of these messages so that p 0 receives the message first and sends a response. Then, p 1 receives the message sent by c r and sends back a response. Finally, c r takes steps to collect these responses and return. We call σ old the part of the execution starting from C until the point that p 0 sends a response, and γ old the suffix of the execution starting from C. Lemma 2 allows us to argue that c r returns (x in 0 , x in 1 ) in γ old . We next present the formalism of the construction.
Construction 1 (Construction of execution γ old (C, p i , c r ) and execution σ old (C, p i , c r )). Let τ be any arbitrary legal execution starting from C 0 which contains just one transaction: client c w executes a write-only transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1 )x 1 ). Fix any i ∈ {0, 1}. For every configuration C that is reached when τ is applied from C 0 in which the value x i is not visible, Lemma 2 implies that there exists at least one client c r {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 } such that if, starting from C, c r executes a fast read-only transaction T r = (r (X 0 ) * , r (X 1 ) * ), then c r returns (x in 0 , x in 1 ) for T r . For every such client c r , we define γ old (C, p i , c r ) to be the execution containing all of the events described below. In γ old (C,
Denote by σ old (C, p i , c r ) the prefix of γ old (C, p i , c r ) up until the step in which p i sends the response. After σ old (C, p i , c r ) has been applied from C, the adversary schedules the delivery of mo 1−i (C, p i , c r ), and lets p 1−i take steps to receive mo 1−i (C, p i , c r ) and send a response to c r . Finally, c r take steps to receive the responses from p 0 and p 1 and return a response for T r .
By the way γ old (C, p i , c r ) is constructed and by Lemma 2, we get the following. Observation 1. The following claims hold: (2) Only processes p i and c r take steps in σ old (C, p i , c r ), so configurations C and RC (C, σ old (C, p i , c r )) are indistinguishable to c w and Figure 2(b) . Again, assume, without loss of generality, that i = 0. (The construction for the case where i = 1 is symmetric.) The construction produces an execution in which T w starts its execution from C 0 and runs solo up to any configuration C in which x 1 is visible. Then, T r is initiated from C and c r takes steps until it sends a message to each of the servers. The adversary schedules the delivery of these messages so that p 1 receives the message first and sends back a response. Then, p 0 receives the message sent by c r and sends back a response. Finally, c r takes steps to collect these responses and return. We call σ new the part of this construction starting from C until the point that p 1 sends a response, and γ new the suffix of this execution starting from C. We later argue (in Observation 2) that c r returns (x 0 , x 1 ) in γ old . We next present the formalism of the construction. Construction 2 (Construction of execution γ new (C, p i , c r ) and execution σ new (C, p i , c r )). Let τ be any legal execution starting from C 0 which contains just one transaction: client c w executes a write-only transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1 )x 1 ). Fix any i ∈ {0, 1} and let c r be any client not in {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 }. For every reachable configuration C when τ is applied from C 0 in which x i is visible, we define γ new (C, p i , c r ) to be the execution containing all of the events described below. In γ new , c r invokes T r starting from C and takes steps until it sends a message mn 0 (C, p i , c r ) to p 0 and a message mn 1 (C, p i , c r ) to p 1 . Let C new (C, p i , c r ) be the resulting configuration. Next, the adversary schedules the delivery of mn 1−i (C, p i , c r ) and let p 1−i take a step to receive mn 1−i (C, p i , c r ).
Construction 2 is depicted in
Since T r is a fast transaction, once p 1−i receives mn 1−i (C, p i , c r ), it sends a response mn ′ 1−i (C, p i , c r ) to c r . This sequence of steps starting from C new (C, p i , c r ) to the step in which p 1−i sends the response is denoted by σ new (C, p i , c r ). Next, the adversary schedules the delivery of mn i (C, p i , c r ) and lets p i take steps until it receives mn i (C, p i , c r ) and sends a response to c r . Finally, c r takes steps to receive the responses from p 0 and p 1 and return a response for T r .
By the way γ new (C, p i , c r ) is constructed, by Definition 2 and by Lemma 1, we get the following.
Observation 2. The following claims hold for γ new (C, p i , c r ):
(2) Configurations C and RC (C, γ new (C, p i , c r )) are indistinguishable to c w and p i . (3) The return value for T r in γ new (C, p i , c r ) is (x 0 , x 1 ).
The Infinite Execution
We prove Theorem 1 by constructing an infinite execution α which contains just one write-only transaction T w and by proving that in α, the values written by T w never becomes visible. We construct α using induction. Specifically, Lemma 3 shows that there is an infinite sequence of executions α 1 , α 2 , . . . such that, all of them are distinct prefixes of α (we let α 0 be the empty execution). Lemma 3 is comprised of two claims which hold for every integer k ≥ 0. The first, shows that α k contains the transmission of at least one message which is sent after the execution of α k −1 from C 0 (and thus, α k −1 is a prefix of α k and α k−1 α k ). The second shows that after α k has been performed from C 0 , the two values written by T w have not yet become visible. Although the proofs of the two claims exhibit many similarities, for clarity of presentation, we have decided not to merge them into one proof. Lemma 3. For any integer k ≥ 1, there exists an execution α k , legal from C 0 , in which only one transaction T w = (w (X 0 )x 0 , w (X 1 )x 1 ) is executed by client c w . Let C k be the configuration that results when α k is applied from C 0 . Then, the following hold:
, where in α ′ k at least one of the following occurs:
• a message is sent by p k %2 to p (k −1)%2 , or • a message is sent by p k %2 to c w and it holds that after c w receives this message, c w sends a message to p (k −1)%2 . (2) In C k , x 0 and x 1 are not visible and T w is still active.
Proof of Lemma 3. By induction on k. We prove the base case together with the induction step, yet we clearly state the difference when the proof diverges. To prove the induction step, fix an integer k > 1 and assume that the claim holds for any j, 1 ≤ j < k.
Proof of claim 1. We start with a high-level description of the proof which is by contradiction. We come up with two executions that have the following properties. In the first execution, a readonly transaction T r = (r (X 0 ) * , r (X 1 ) * ) (initiated by a client c k r {c in 0 , c in 1 , c w }) is executed starting from C k −1 . Since x 0 and x 1 are not visible neither in C 0 (since T w has not yet started its execution in C 0 ), nor in C k−1 if k > 1 (by induction hypothesis), the response for T r in this execution is (x in 0 , x in 1 ). This execution is constructed based on Construction 1. In the second execution, c k r invokes T r after T w has executed solo long enough so that both values x 0 and x 1 are visible (minimal progress for write-only transactions implies that visibility of x 0 and x 1 will eventually happen). So, c k r returns (x 0 , x 1 ) for T r in this execution. The second execution is constructed based on Construction 2. We then combine parts of these two executions to get a third execution, γ . Execution γ is constructed so that we can prove that in it, c k r will return the same value for X k %2 as c k r does in the first execution, and the same value for X (k−1)%2 as c k r does in the second execution. Therefore, in γ , c k r
, x (k −1)%2 ) for T r . This contradicts Lemma 1.
We continue with the details of the proof of claim 1. To derive a contradiction, assume that the claim does not hold, i.e., we let c w , p 0 , p 1 take steps starting from C k −1 and assume the following:
• p k %2 sends no message to p (k −1)%2 ;
• p k %2 sends no message to c w for which it holds that after c w receives it, p k %2 sends a message to p (k −1)%2 .
Since x 0 and x 1 are not visible neither in C 0 nor in C k −1 , Lemma 2 implies that there exists at least one client c k r {c w , c in 0 , c in 1 } such that if, starting from C k −1 , c k r executes a read-only transaction T r = (r (X 0 ) * , r (X 1 ) * ), then c k r returns (x in 0 , x in 1 ) for T r . We derive the contradiction by constructing the execution γ , in which, in addition to T w , c k r executes such a read-only transaction T r , and by showing that γ contradicts Lemma 1.
To construct γ , we need to define an execution β and a subsequence β new of it. Specifically, β new is utilized as part of execution γ . Roughly speaking, γ starts with σ old (C k−1 , p k %2 , c k r ) (see Construction 1) up to the point that p k %2 reports x in k %2 for X k %2 to c k r (see Observation 1) . Recall that only processes c k r and p k %2 take steps in σ old (C k −1 , p k %2 , c k r ) (by Observation 1). Then, the events of β new are executed to take the system in a configuration where x 0 and x 1 are visible. The assumption we made above to derive a contradiction, allows us to design β new so that, c k r and p k%2 do not take any steps in it, and the values written by T w are visible after β new is applied starting from C k −1 (as well as from
Afterwards, an execution γ new , which is derived based on Construction 2, is applied from the resulting configuration. In γ new only process p (k −1)%2 take steps (see Observation 2). Execution β new has been designed so that p (k −1)%2 is "unaware" of p k %2 's decision on what to report to c k r as the current value of the object that p k %2 stores. So, p (k −1)%2 reports x (k −1)%2 for X (k −1)%2 as it does in Construction 2 (Observation 2). The construction of γ concludes with c k r taking steps until T r responds. We argue (below) that c k r receives in γ the same message regarding the value of X k %2 as in
for X k %2 (by Observation 1). We also argue that c k r receives in γ the same message regarding the value of X (k −1)%2 as in γ new , so it returns Observation 2) . This contradicts Lemma
1.
We first define β. For the base case (where k = 1), c w invokes T w starting from C 0 and executes solo (i.e., only c w , p 0 , p 1 take steps) until x 0 and x 1 are visible; since T w has not yet been invoked in C 0 , x 0 and x 1 are not visible in C 0 . For the induction step, the induction hypothesis (claim 2) implies that in C k −1 , x 0 and x 1 are not visible. Again, we let c w execute solo, starting from C k −1 , until x 0 and x 1 are visible (minimal progress implies that this will eventually happen). In either case, let C v be the first configuration after C k −1 in which x 0 and x 1 are visible. Let β be the sequence of steps taken from C k−1 to C v (all of them are by c w and the servers).
In this and the next two paragraphs, we define β new and show that it is legal from C k −1 . Let β ′ p be the shortest prefix of β which contains all messages sent by c w to p (k−1)%2 , and let β ′ s be the remaining suffix of β. Let β p be the subsequence of β ′ p in which all steps taken by p k %2 have been removed. Let β s be the subsequence of β ′ s containing only steps by p (k −1)%2 . Let β new be β p · β s . Note that β new does not contain any step by p k%2 . Executions β, β p and β s are illustrated in Figure 3a . In the figure, symbols i, 1 − i ∈ {0, 1} refer to k%2 and (k − 1)%2 respectively.
To show that β new is legal from C k −1 , we first argue that β p is legal from C k −1 . Because β ′ p is a prefix of β, β ′ p is legal from C k −1 . By assumption, p k %2 sends no message to p (k −1)%2 , so if p (k −1)%2 receives any message from p k %2 in β ′ p , then the message must have been sent before C k −1 (and must have been received after it), i.e., the message is not sent in β ′ p . (For the base case, since no message is in transit in C 0 , p (k −1)%2 receives no message from p k %2 in β ′ p .) Moreover, by assumption, after α k −1 , p k %2 sends no message to c w for which it holds that after c w receives it, c w sends a message to p (k −1)%2 . Since, by definition, β ′ p ends with a message sent by c w to p (k −1)%2 (if β ′ p is not empty), it follows that: for the base case, c w receives no message from p k %2 in β ′ p ; for the induction step, if c w receives any message from p k %2 in β ′ p , then the message has been sent before C k −1 . Thus, β p , which results from the removal of all steps taken by p k %2 from β ′ p , is legal from C k −1 . Moreover, RC (C k −1 , β ′ p ) and RC (C k −1 , β p ) (i.e., the configurations that result when β ′ p and β p , respectively, are applied from C k −1 ) are indistinguishable to p (k −1)%2 and c w .
To complete the argument that β new is legal from C k−1 , it remains to prove that β s is legal from RC (C k −1 , β p ). By definition, only p (k −1)%2 takes steps in β s . Note that, because
and
, it follows that β s is legal from RC (C k −1 , β p ). We next argue that β s is indeed legal from configura-
. By assumption, if p (k −1)%2 receives any message from p k%2 in β s , then the message has been sent before C k −1 (i.e., the message has not been sent in β). For the base case, since no message is in transit in C 0 , p (k−
From the arguments above, it also follows that RC (
We continue to construct γ . To do so, we use Figure 3b illustrates the construction of γ , where symbols i, 1 − i ∈ {0, 1} refer to k%2 and (k − 1)%2 respectively. (For simplicity, we
from the notations below.) Recall that in γ , a client starts a read-only transaction from C k −1 . One server responds to the client first (i.e., σ old is applied from C k −1 ). Then the write-only transaction makes progress and the values written turn to be visible (specifically, β new is applied after σ old ). Then the other server receives the request of the read-only transaction and responds to the client (specifically, σ new is applied). Recall that (as we argue below) to one server, γ is indistinguishable from γ old (i.e., the execution illustrated in Figure 3b is indistinguishable from that in Figure 2a ) and thus the server returns an old value, while to the other server, γ is indistinguishable from γ new (i.e., the execution illustrated in Figure 3b is indistinguishable from that in Figure 2b ) and thus the other server returns a new value. This then leads to the contradiction.
We are now ready to formally define γ . Starting from C k −1 , the adversary applies
) (we later prove that the application of these steps from C k −1 is legal). By Construction 1, in the last step of σ old , p k%2 sends a message mo ′ , and lets c k r take steps until T r completes (this will happen because T r is a fast transaction). This concludes the construction of γ . We argue that γ is legal. By construction, only processes c k r and p k %2 take steps in σ old . By Observation 1 (claim 2), C k −1 and RC (C k −1 , σ old ) are indistinguishable to c w and p (k−1)%2 . Since only c w and p (k−1)%2 take steps in β new , it follows that β new is legal from RC (C k −1 , σ old ). Since the processes that take steps in σ old and
are indistinguishable to all processes. Recall that RC (C k −1 , β new ) and C v are indistinguishable to p (k −1)%2 . Since σ old is composed of a sequence of steps in which only c k r and p k %2 take steps,
Because only p (k −1)%2 takes steps in σ new and σ new is legal from C new , it follows that σ new is legal from RC (C k −1 , σ old · β new ). Therefore, γ is legal.
We contains the value x (k −1)%2 . Recall that (by assumption) c k r does not receive any other messages from p 0 and p 1 . Thus, c k r receives for X k %2 just one value, namely, the same value it receives for it in γ old . Similarly, it receives for X (k −1)%2 just one value, namely, the same value it receives for it in γ new . It follows that in γ , the values that c k r returns are x in k %2 for X k %2 and x (k −1)%2 for X (k −1)%2 . This contradicts Lemma 1. (Note that γ is an execution utilized just for proving claim 1; for every k > 1, we build it from scratch to prove the induction step for k.) Definition of α k and C k . We now define α k and C k . By claim 1, it follows that in any legal execution starting from C k −1 in which c w executes solo, at least one of the following two statements hold: (1) p k %2 sends a message to p (k −1)%2 ; (2) p k%2 sends a message to c w so that after c w receives this message, c w sends a message to p (k −1)%2 . Let ms k be the first message that satisfies any of the two statements above. We construct execution α ′ k as follows. In α ′ k , T w executes solo starting from C k −1 until ms k is sent 7 . Let α k = α k−1 · α ′ k , and let C k be the configuration that results when α k is applied from C 0 . Proof of claim 2. We use similar arguments as in the proof of claim 1. We assume that claim 2 does not hold, i.e., we assume that in C k , x i is visible for some i ∈ {0, 1}. To derive a contradiction, we construct an execution δ (similarly to that the construction of γ ) and show that δ contradicts Lemma 1. We first define executions ρ and ρ new in a way similar to β and β new defined in the proof of claim 1. We finally define δ based on σ old (C k −1 , p k %2 , c k r ), ρ new , and σ new (C k , p k %2 , c k r ), and we argue that in δ , c k r returns a response for T r that contradicts Lemma 1.
We now present the details of the proof of claim 2. Assume that in C k , x i is visible for some i ∈ {0, 1}. We construct δ by utilizing executions
Because by assumption, x i is visible at C k , Observation 2 implies that c k r returns x (k −1)%2 for X (k −1)%2 and x k%2 for X k %2 forT r in γ new (C k , p k %2 , c k r ). To construct δ , we first define an execution ρ and some subsequences of it, and we study their properties. (The construction of ρ and its subsequences is similar to that of β and its subsequences. Yet, the reasoning of why the construction is legal is different.) Let ρ be 7 Clearly, in α ′ k , p k %2 must take at least one step. For the case where k ≥ 2, we also require that in α ′ k , in the first step which p k %2 takes, message ms k −1 is delivered at p k %2 (in order to comply with our model of finite message delay). the sequence of steps which are taken from C k −1 to C k , i.e., ρ = α ′
The Limits of the Impossibility Result
Theorem 1 shows that multi-object write transactions (W) are incompatible with nonblocking (N), one-roundtrip (O) and one-value (V) read-only transactions. In this section, we investigate the limits of our impossibility result. We show that it is sufficient to relax any of these properties to obtain a distributed storage system that satisfies the rest. To this end, we describe possible designs that achieve combinations of three out of the four properties. N + R + V. This combination supports fast read-only transactions and is implemented by COPS-SNOW [41] . When a client c writes a new value x 1 of object X 1 , c piggybacks the information about its causal dependencies.Before making x 1 visible, the server p 1 storing X 1 contacts all servers that store objects listed in such dependency list. For each such object X , p 1 collects the identifiers of the readonly transactions that have read a value of X that is not the last written. Then p 1 enforces that x 1 is invisible to these read-only transactions. This prevents a read-only transaction from reading x 1 and then x 0 , if in the meanwhile x ′ 0 has been created such that
Recall that COPS-SNOW does not ensure the W property, i.e., it does not support multi-object write transactions. N + V + W. This design is implemented by Wren [55] . In this system, the servers periodically exchange information about the minimum timestamp among those of complete transactions. This cutoff timestamp is such that there does not exist any non-complete (or future) transaction with a lower timestamp. The cutoff timestamp is used to identify a snapshot of the data storage system from which a readonly transaction can read without blocking. A new object written by a client is assigned a timestamp higher than the cutoff timestamp, so as to reflect the causal dependencies of the object. Therefore, each client caches locally the values of the objects it writes, as long as their timestamps are smaller than the cutoff. This mechanism allows a client to read its own writes that are not included yet in the snapshot identified by the cutoff timestamp. Thus, each read-only transaction undergoes a first round of communication to get informed about the cutoff timestamp (we remark that this timestamp can be provided by any server) and then executes a second round of communication to actually read the objects. N + R + W. Although we are not aware of any system that implements this design, we briefly discuss a modification of the COPS system [39] to achieve this combination of properties. COPS does not implement multi-object write transactions and implements read-only transactions that are nonblocking but may require two rounds of communication, each communicating just one value of the object to be read. We can augment COPS to achieve R and W as follows. Each write operation within a transaction must carry a) the values of the other objects written in the same transaction and b) information about all objects on which the transaction causally depends (including their values). This additional meta-data is stored with each written object. Hence, c executes a read-only transaction as follows. First, for each object o to read, c retrieves the value of o and the additional meta-data from the corresponding server. Then, once c has received a reply from each involved partition, c identifies, for each object, the last written value, which is returned to the application. This protocol is not efficient, as it requires to store and communicate a prohibitively big amount of data. It is an open problem whether a more efficient N+R+W protocol exists. R + V + W. This design is implemented by RoCoCo-SNOW [41] and Spanner [19] , which achieve strict serializability, and hence satisfy causal consistency. RoCoCo-SNOW implements a mechanism similar to COPS-SNOW, but assumes the a priori knowledge of the data accessed by transactions, which are executed as stored procedures. Spanner assumes tightly synchronized physical clocks and leverages the known bound on clock drift to order transactions.
It is an open problem whether a R + V + W implementation exists that does not rely on such assumptions.
RELATED WORK
Existing systems. Table 1 characterizes existing systems from the point of view of the sub-properties of fast read-only transactions that they achieve, their support for multi-object write transactions, and their target consistency level. Consistently with our theorem, none among the systems that target the system model described in Section 2 implements multi-object write transactions and fast read-only transactions. Several systems achieve three out of the four properties we consider, and COPS-SNOW is the only one that implements fast read-only-transactions while complying with our system model. Our theorem implies that the design of these systems cannot be improved with respect to the properties we consider. SwiftCloud and Eiger-PS implement fast read-only transactions and support multi-object write transactions, but assume a system model that differs from the one we target. Although they eventually complete all writes, the values they write may be invisible to some clients for an indefinitely long time. Hence, read-only transactions may see very old values of some objects, even the initial ones. To improve the freshness of the data seen by the clients, servers can communicate with clients out of the scope of transactional operations. This requires that the servers maintain a view of the connected clients. Typically, there are far more clients than servers, so this design choice results in reduced performance and scalability and is avoided by state-of-the-art data platforms. Furthermore, SwiftCloud assumes only a single partition that stores the whole data set (potentially fully replicated across multiple sites). Impossibility results. Existing impossibility results on storage systems typically rely on stronger consistency or progress properties. Brewer [16] conjectured the CAP theorem, according to which no implementation guarantees consistency, availability, and network partition tolerance. Gilbert and Lynch [28] formalized and proved this conjecture. Specifically, they formalized consistency by using the notion of atomic objects [34] (i.e., by assuming linearizability [29] , which is stronger than causal consistency). Roohitavaf et al. [53] considered a replicated storage system implemented using data centers (i.e., clusters of servers), and a model in which any value written is immediately visible to the reads initiated in the same data center. They proved that it is impossible to ensure causal consistency, availability and network partition tolerance across data centers. Their proof (as well as the proof of the CAP Theorem) rely on message losses, whereas in our model no message can be lost.
Mahajan et al. [50] proved that no implementation guarantees one-way convergence (a progress condition stating that if processes communicate appropriately, then they eventually converge on the values they read for objects), availability, and any consistency stronger than real time causal consistency [50] assuming that messages may be lost. In their model, communication may occur among any pair of processes. On the contrary, in our model, communication cannot occur directly between clients, the progress property we assume is simpler (and decoupled from the underlying communication), and no message may be lost.
Variants of causal consistency motivated by replicated systems have been presented in [8, 62] . Their definitions are based on the events that are executed at the servers (and not on the histories of operations executed in the transactions issued by the clients). Attiya et al. [8] proved that a (non-transactional) replicated storage system implementing multi-valued registers (i.e., registers for which a read returns the set of values written by conflicting writes) cannot satisfy any consistency strictly stronger than observable causal consistency. Xiang and Vaidya [62] defined the notion of replicacentric causal consistency, and they proved that (non-transactional) replicated distributed storage systems ensuring this consistency property have to track writes. These works are in different avenues than our work and focus on other models than that in our paper.
Lu et al. [41] proved the SNOW theorem, which shows that no fully-functional distributed transactional system can support fast strictly serializable read-only transactions. Lu et al. also showed that any fully-functional distributed transactional system that achieves a consistency level weaker than or equal to process-ordered serializability [41] (hence including causal consistency) can support fast read-only transactions. Tomsic et al. [60] further showed that implementing fast read-only transactions with an order-preserving consistency level (as is the case for causal consistency) is possible only by allowing read-only transactions to read possibly stale values of the objects being accessed. These results may seem at odds with our impossibility result. However, these results rest on very weak assumptions on the progress guarantees of write operations. Although they assume that all writes eventually complete, the values they write may be invisible to clients for an indefinitely long time. Such a weak assumption allows the design of trivial algorithms in which read-only transactions can return arbitrarily old values -even the initial ones-for the objects they read.
Recently, Didona et. al [23] showed a lower bound on the number of bits that must be communicated in order to support fast causally consistent read-only transactions in distributed storage systems. On the contrary, this paper focuses on the design implications of fast read transactions in distributed transactional such systems, showing that they are incompatible with multi-object write transactions.
Since the introduction of causal consistency by Ahamad et al. [2] for a shared memory system, other versions of causal consistency has been studied [39, 52] . Our result holds if we replace our definition of causal consistency with those provided in these papers.
CONCLUSION
We present an impossibility result that establishes a fundamental trade-off in the design of distributed transactional storage systems: fast read transactions cannot be achieved by fully-functional transactional storage systems. The design of such systems must either sacrifice fast read transactions, or must settle for reduced functionality, i.e., support only single-object write transactions.
Unlike most previous work on distributed transactional systems, which target strong consistency, our result assumes only causal consistency. This broadens the scope of our result which applies also to systems that implement any consistency level stronger than causal consistency, or a hybrid consistency level that includes causal consistency. Proving our result under such weak consistency model is nontrivial and required us to devise a complex proof.
Our result sheds light on the design choices of state-of-the-art distributed transactional storage systems, and is useful for the architects of such systems because it identifies impossible designs.
Our result also opens several interesting research questions, such as investigating which is the weakest consistency condition for which our impossibility result holds. In addition, it is interesting to further investigate the design of systems that provide some of the combinations of the studied properties, as discussed in Section 3.4.
